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 Stylized Fact 1 
  
Real estate has ‘always’  
been subject to strong  
price volatility. 
 
Overview 
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Historical real house price indices  
in Amsterdam, Norway and the U.S. 
Source: Shiller (2006) based on Shiller (2005), Eichholtz (1997), Eitrheim and Erlandsen (2004) 
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Volatility has increased in recent decades  
(…at least in UK) 
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House prices in London increase more 
strongly and are more volatile (1973q4-2016q2) 
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 Stylized Fact 2 
  
Various key measures of 
residential and commercial 
property markets behave 
cyclically.  
(i.e., measures are serially correlated  
and mean-reverting)  
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Los Angeles
Example: Deviation of house prices from 
long-run trend in LA (1980q1-2016q2) 
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City of London
Example: Deviation of office prices from 
long-run trend in  City of London (1960-2006) 
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Example: London office  
vacancy rates and effective rents 
11 Source: Hendershott et al. (1999) 
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 Stylized Fact 3 
  
The volatility and duration of 
property cycles varies 
substantially across markets  
and property types.  
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Source: Own calculations based on FHFA all-transactions HP index, Hilber (2016)
San Francisco
Example: Housing market of SF (CA)  
– Deviation from 50q moving trend price 
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Columbus, OH
Example: Housing market of Columbus (OH)  
– Deviation from 50q moving trend price 
14 
Intro – stylized facts       Exogenous cycles – theory/evidence       Further puzzles       Endogenous cycles       Conclusions 
Source: K.E. Case, Land Lines (Lincoln Institute), pp. 8-13, http://www.lincolninst.edu/pubs/1743_Land-Lines-January-2010 
Housing transaction prices in 17 MSAs 
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Example: Cycle duration 
16 
 Duration of full house price cycle based on most recent full 
and clearly defined cycle 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Cycle duration (in q.) across 19 OECD countries (Bracke 2013) 
 
 
MSA 
Start Date of 1st 
Boom/Bust Cycle 
Start Date of 2nd 
Boom/Bust Cycle 
Duration in 
Years 
Phoenix 1980 1998 18 
Fort Worth 1982 1999 17 
Dallas 1982 1999 17 
… … … … 
San Diego 1988 2000 12 
Grand Rapids 1988 1999 11 
Source: Hilber (2003), own calculations based on OFHEO data, N = 39 
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Pct10 Pct25 Median Pct75 Pct90 
Completed upturns 8 12 21 32 47 
Completed downturns 7 13 17 23 32 
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Las Vegas
Housing cycles are local in nature 
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Boulder (CO)
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Some theoretical considerations… 
 Consider a metro area with a large number of 
small local jurisdictions j=1,…,J  
 
 All jurisdictions are perfect substitutes (same 
amenities, same LPGs and taxes) 
 Households have identical preferences (same 
WTP) 
 Households relocate without cost (no attachment) 
 
 Question: Should the availability of land in 
jurisdiction j matter for capitalization of 
demand shocks? (DISCUSS) 
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Intuitive explanation 
 Under these assumptions: demand is 
perfectly elastic! 
 
 If jurisdiction j receives a grant of 1000£ per 
household  Households from other jurisdictions 
will want to move to j until house values in j  
increase by exactly 1000£ 
 
 Slope of supply curve should not matter for 
price capitalization under these assumptions 
(only quantity adjustment affected)… 
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The case of perfectly elastic demand 
Unconstrained location 
(small town A) 
 
Constrained location 
(neighboring small town B) 
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Demand 
Supply 
 Slope of supply curve does not affect extent of price 
capitalization (always 100%) but matters greatly for  
new construction! 
 
 Hedonic model assumes perfectly elastic demand! 
 
(building boom!) 
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Glaeser and Ward (2009, JUE) 
“There are so many close substitutes for most towns [in 
Greater Boston] that we would not expect restricting of 
housing supply in one town to raise prices in that town 
relative to another town with similar demographics and 
density levels. Restrictions on building in one suburban 
community should not raise prices in that community relative 
to another town with equivalent amenities, any more than 
restrictions on the production of Saudi Arabian crude will 
raise the price of Saudi Arabian crude relative to Venezuelan 
crude. Of course, Saudi Arabia’s quantity restrictions will still 
raise the global price of oil, but this cannot be seen by 
comparisons of prices across oil producers.” 
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How realistic is this case? 
 Two neighboring small towns  
 Often close substitutes but not always (school 
quality often very different; each town has some 
unique features) 
 City centre vs. small town at edge 
 Poor substitutes: very different amenities, local 
public services, commuting times 
 Two metro areas in same country 
 Very poor substitutes: NYC very different from 
Columbus (Ohio) 
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How realistic is this case? (Cont.) 
 In world with imperfect substitutability of land  
 Relocation costs matter 
 Preferences (tastes) matter (e.g. attachment to 
place of birth; love for mountains/solitude) 
 Why? 
 Take grant example: If relocation costs are > 
1000£, no household will move, unless HHs 
experience ‘mobility shock’! 
 More generally: heterogeneous preferences & 
imperfect substitutability make local demand 
curves downward sloping (because each HH 
has different WTP for attributes of location!) 
Intro – stylized facts       Exogenous cycles – theory/evidence       Further puzzles       Endogenous cycles       Conclusions 
25 
The role of supply constraints 
 Consider labour demand shock in two locations 
that are not perfect substitutes & HH differ in 
tastes for amenities and local public services… 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Unconstrained location 
(Phoenix, LV) 
Constrained location 
(SF, LA, London) 
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 Demand 
Supply 
(building boom!) 
Intro – stylized facts       Exogenous cycles – theory/evidence       Further puzzles       Endogenous cycles       Conclusions 
26 
Just in Theory? 
 Look at  
 city that has very little undeveloped 
land & is tightly regulated and compare 
with  
 city with plenty of open land in the 
surrounding area & few land use 
restrictions 
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A prime example of a city with  
inelastic land supply 
Little undeveloped land 
+ geographical 
constraints +  
tight land use control 
San Francisco (CA) 
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Columbus (OH) 
A prime example of a city with  
plenty of open land 
29 
Plenty of open land surrounding city + 
no geographical constraints + 
lax land use controls 
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San Francisco (CA) vs. Columbus (OH) 
Deviation of house price index from  
long-run trend (1982q1-2016q2) 
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Columbus, OH
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San Francisco (CA) vs. Columbus (OH) 
Deviation of house price index from moving 
average (last 50 quarters, until 2016q2) 
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San Francisco
Excursus: The housing supply curve is  
‘kinked downwards’ 
Intro – stylized facts       Exogenous cycles – theory/evidence       Further puzzles       Endogenous cycles       Conclusions 
32 
Housing Stock 
H
o
u
s
e
 P
ri
c
e
s
 
Demand 
Supply 
Housing Stock 
H
o
u
s
e
 P
ri
c
e
s
 Demand 
Supply 
Housing stock is durable! 
Unconstrained location 
(Phoenix, LV) 
Constrained location 
(SF, LA, London) 
Other examples… 
Chattanooga, 
TN-GA 
Los 
Angeles 
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 What types of constraints 
make supply inelastic? 
 
  Consider the case of 
England… 
   
 (Based on Hilber & Vermeulen, 2016) 
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Open question 
35 
Candidate #1:  
Regulatory supply constraints 
 English planning system widely viewed as 
inflexible 
 Since 1947: virtually no fiscal incentives at 
local level to permit development 
 ‘Development control system’ (catering to 
NIMBYs) particularly near green belts 
 ‘Horizontal’ constraints: Green belts 
surrounding major cities 
 ‘Vertical’ constraints: height restrictions & 
protected vistas 
 Other regulations: preservation policies 
(conservation areas, listed buildings) & codes 
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An illustration of London’s restrictiveness:  
1. London’s green belt 
36 
Source: Barney’s blog  
(http://barneystringer.wordpress.com/2013/11/21/londons-green-belt) 
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2. London’s height restrictions, preservation 
policies &protected vistas 
37 
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Source: Cheshire and Derricks (2013) 
Protected view from  
King Henry VIII’s Mound (Richmond Park)
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16km 
Backdrop: 
Liverpool Street 
Station area 
  
Distance to…  
- Silicon roundabout: 
850m 
- BoE (City): 600m 
- St. Paul’s: 1km 
 
Candidate #1: 
Regulatory supply constraints (cont.) 
 Barker-review (2004, 2006) suggested 
that regulatory constraints may be 
important causal driver of high house 
prices and volatility 
 
 To be tested… 
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40 
Candidate #2:  
Physical supply constraints 
 Could also be physical supply 
constraints 
 
 a) Limited local availability of open 
developable space (very high opportunity 
costs) 
 b) Steep slopes (difficult + costly to build) 
 
 To be tested… 
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How to test in practice? 
 Proxy for regulatory constraints 
 
 Use direct measure of how restrictive Local 
Planning Authorities (LPAs) are: Refusal rate for 
major residential projects (1979-2008) 
 Proxies for physical constraints 
 
 Use land cover satellite date to calculate share 
developable land that is developed (in 1990) 
 Use raster grid data to derive measure of slope 
related constraints: range in elevation (or 
alternatively: standard deviation of slope) 
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Source: Hilber and Vermeulen (2016) 
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Average refusal rate 
(major residential 
projects) 1979-2008 
Share developable 
land developed, 
1990  
Elevation range 
  
Some circumstantial evidence regulatory 
constraints may be important… 
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Circumstantial evidence… (cont.) 
44 
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Circumstantial evidence… (cont.) 
45 
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Planning appears to affect urban form… 
 
46 
Dutch concentrated dispersal 
Wider South East 
green belt constraint 
Flemish region dispersal Source: Echenique (2009) 
Reading 
 Similar densities 
 Less restrictive 
planning 
associated with 
more sprawl… 
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Restrictiveness strongly correlates with 
house price cycles—but is this causal? 
47 
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How to test rigorously? 
Empirical strategy 
48 
 Estimating equation: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
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j = 1,…, 353 
t = 1974, ..., 2008 
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Empirical strategy (cont.) 
49 
 Three potential endogeneity concerns: 
 Refusal rate: Refusal rate may be endogenous to 
demand conditions & developers may not apply if 
likely rejected 
 Share developed: Contemporaneous D & S factors 
(incl. regulation) may affect share developed 
 Earnings: Local earnings can be influenced by house 
prices (via sorting) and therefore may reflect housing 
supply as well as housing demand 
 
 Problem: Estimates of ordinary regressions are 
likely biased 
 
 Luckily, instrumental variables (IV) approach 
(2SLS) allows us to address this problem & 
identify unbiased causal effects… 
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Basic idea of IV (2SLS) approach 
50 
 Find ‘instrumental variables’  
 Ideally strongly correlated with endogenous RHVs (here: 
refusal rate, share developed & earnings), conditional on 
other covariates 
 But do not directly impact the LHV (here house prices) 
(uncorrelated with error term) 
 
 Use exogenous variation from instruments to predict 
endogenous RHVs (refusal rate, share developed & 
earnings) in 1st stage 
 
 Then use predicted RHVs in 2nd stage to identify the 
causal and unbiased effect of these RHVs on the LHV 
(house prices) 
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Excursus:  
IVs to identify causal effect of refusal rate 
Two instruments: 
 
1. Change in delay rate (pre-/post-policy reform in 
2002) [IV#1] 
 
 Labour government introduced delay rate targets in 
2002, but no refusal rate targets! 
 Restrictive LPAs had strong incentive to substitute 
delays with refusals 
 Most restrictive LPAs will be ones with greatest 
decrease of delay rate post-reform 
 Identifying assumption: Conditional on location FEs, 
change in delay rate affects impact of earnings on 
house prices only through planning restrictiveness 
 51 
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IVs for refusal rate (cont.) 
2. Local vote share [IV#2] 
 Middle income Labour voters have traditionally 
cared more about housing affordability and less 
about protecting house values (fewer own 
homes!)  
 Identifying assumption: Conditional on location 
FEs, local vote share affects impact of earnings 
on house prices only through planning 
restrictiveness 
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IV to identify causal effect  
of land scarcity 
 Instrumental variable: Historical density 
from 1911 [IV#3] 
Instrument pre-dates ‘birth’ of modern British 
planning system (TCPA of 1947) by several 
decades 
Identifying assumption:  
 Density almost 100 years ago will be indicative of early 
forms of agglomeration & local amenities, so should be 
strongly correlated with share of developed land today  
 But, controlling for LPA FEs, historic density should not 
directly explain changes in contemporaneous HPs 
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IV to identify causal effect of earnings 
 Instrumental variable: ‘Labour demand 
shock’ measure (Bartik 1991) [IV#4] 
Use local industry composition in 1971 and 
national employment growth in the industries to 
predict local employment growth (shift-share 
approach) 
Local industry composition in 1971 pre-dates our 
regression sample  
Ideally: would instrument earnings but leads to 
weak identification 
Replace earnings with plausibly exogenous demand 
shock measure (can no longer interpret coefficients as 
price-earnings elasticity) 
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Empirical strategies 
 Strategy 1: Use TSLS and instruments #1 to 
#3 to identify causal effects of supply 
constraints measures / ignore concern that 
local earnings might be endogenous 
 
 Strategy 2: Replicate this specification but 
replace earnings with instrument #4  
 Can no longer interpret coefficient as price 
earnings elasticity 
 But yields plausibly unbiased estimates 
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Excursus:  
Data 
 House price index 
 Land Registry (1995 - 2008), CML (1974 - 1995) 
 Index adjusts for mix of housing types 
 
 Real weekly earnings of FT working men 
 ASHE / NES 
 
+  Regulatory data (DCLG), satellite data 
(various sources), historic data (Census) 
 
 All geographically matched to 2001 LPA 
boundaries (353) 
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Results: naïve OLS 
LHV: Log(real house price index) 
Coefficient 
Log(earnings) 0.32*** 
Log(earnings) x average 
refusal rate 
0.067*** 
Log(earnings) x share 
developed 
0.094** 
Log(earnings) x elevation 
range 
-0.00047 
Year-FEs Yes 
LPA-FEs & constant Yes 
Refusal rate +1 std. 
dev. (+8.7%)  
price-earn. 
elasticity increases 
by +0.067  
(~+21%) 
House price-
earnings elasticity of 
LPA with average 
constraints 
Endogenous! 
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Results of IV: 1st stage  
(validity of instruments) 
 All three ‘instruments’ (#1 - #3) have the 
predicted sign and are highly statistically 
significant (at 1%-level) 
 
 Test-statistics suggest that instruments may be 
valid and strongly identify the causal effects of 
regulatory and scarcity related supply 
constraints 
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Results of IV: 2nd stage 
LHV: Log(real house price index) 
Log(earnings) 0.089 
Log(earnings) x average refusal rate 0.29*** 
Log(earnings) x share developed 0.30*** 
Log(earnings) x elevation range 0.095** 
Year-FEs Yes 
LPA-FEs & constant Yes 
Kleibergen Paap F-stat 11.8 
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Quantitative effects  
(based on IV with instruments #1-3) 
 
 If planning system were relaxed in av. 
LPA: 
 House prices in av. LPA: -35% 
 and developable land were abundant: 
 House prices in av. LPA: -45% 
 and LPA were completely flat: 
 House prices in av. LPA: -48% 
 
Note: These are likely lower bound estimates for a number of reasons (see 
 paper for details) 
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What would house prices in  
average English LPA be if… 
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North East vs. South East & 
90th vs. 10th percentile 
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Use labour demand shock  
instead of earnings (IV 2nd stage) 
LHV: Log(real house price index) 
LPA TTWA 
Log(labour demand shock) 0.31** 0.24** 
Log(LDS) x average 
refusal rate 
0.66*** 0.59*** 
Log(LDS) x share 
developed 
0.92*** 0.39*** 
Log(LDS) x elevation range 0.33** 0.12 
Year-FEs Yes Yes 
LPA-FEs & constant Yes Yes 
Kleibergen Paap F-stat 5.2 65.7 
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Excursus:  
Other results & robustness checks 
 Differential impact of supply constraints 
significantly larger during boom than during 
bust  
 
 Impact of local land scarcity confined to 
highly developed locations (GLA) 
 
 Main results hold for alternative definitions 
of ‘local housing markets’ (TTWAs, urban 
TTWAs, FUR, Pre-1996 counties) 
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Robustness checks (Cont.) 
 Results not sensitive to using alternative 
measures of share developed (excl. semi-
developable land; flood risk areas) 
 
 Results not sensitive to using alternative 
proxies for elevation/ruggedness 
 
 Results hold for alternative IV-strategies and 
alternative measure for regulatory 
restrictiveness (shadow price) 
Intro – stylized facts       Exogenous cycles – theory/evidence       Further puzzles       Endogenous cycles       Conclusions 
67 
Preliminary conclusions 
1. Real estate markets are ‘cyclical’ and ‘local’ in nature 
 
2. HPs respond much more strongly to repeated local demand 
shifts (business cycles) in more supply constrained 
markets 
 
3. Regulatory constraints in conjunction with strong demand 
in desirable areas (London!) are main causal driver of 
severe UK housing affordability crisis & volatility 
 
4. Physical constraints matter too but impact is very  
non-linear 
 
5. All local supply constraints and earnings fluctuations jointly 
still cannot explain all cyclicality—role for macro-
economic factors + supply constraints at aggregate 
level! 
 
6. Tight regulation reinforces wealth inequality – elderly and 
wealthy homeowners benefit (and thus support tighter 
regulation), the younger renters lose out 
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Overview 
1. Real estate cycles: some stylized facts 
 
2. Exogenous cycles 
 Theoretical considerations 
 Long-term supply constraints and  
price dynamics: the case of England 
 Preliminary conclusions 
 
 
3. Some further stylized facts and puzzles 
 
4. Endogenous cycles and behavioural 
explanations: theories and evidence 
 
5. Conclusions and policy implications 
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Overview 
1. Real estate cycles: some stylized facts 
 
2. Exogenous cycles 
 Theoretical considerations 
 Long-term supply constraints and  
price dynamics: the case of England 
 Preliminary conclusions 
 
 
3. Some further stylized facts and puzzles 
 
4. Endogenous cycles and behavioural 
explanations: theories and evidence 
 
5. Conclusions and policy implications 
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Lecture 1 in a nutshell… 
 Effect of demand volatility on land and house prices… 
2D
City with inelastic supply 
# HU 
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D0 
Po 
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D0 
Price of 
developable 
land 
Price of 
developable 
land 
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P
P
City with elastic supply 
P2 
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Many puzzles remain! 
 Example: Japanese (property) asset bubble 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: Nikkei and Japan Real Estate Institute  
(http://inflationmatters.com/japanese-deflation-myth/) 
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Some more puzzles… 
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How can we explain?  
Revisit phenomenon of real estate cycles… 
 What do house prices measure? 
 Forward looking concept 
 If market participants have perfect foresight: 
Price = Sum of discounted future rents (and costs) 
associated with property/land 
 So far assumed cycles are driven by repeated 
exogenous demand shifts (=business cycles) 
 Economic boom  property price boom 
 Recession  property price bust 
 Magnitude of ‘exogenous cycles’ depends on supply 
price elasticity 
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But we ignored existence of… 
 Lags (planning, development, construction)  Often 
lagged adjustment 
 
 Evidence of ‘disequilibrium’: ‘overbuilding’ & high 
vacancy rates + cycles in transaction volume and ‘time 
on market’ 
 
 Mortgage markets  downpayment & liquidity 
constraints 
 
 Existence of myopic agents, unrealistic 
expectations & other ‘behavioural aspects’ 
 
 Transaction costs and other market imperfections 
(i.e. assumed efficient markets) 
 
 May give rise to ‘endogenous cycles’ – initial shock 
may trigger endogenous oscillations (=cycles 
independent of exogenous shocks)… 
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Alternative explanations 
1. Myopic agents (developers & lenders) + lags 
 
2. Irrational exuberance (euphoria of investors) 
 
3. Liquidity constraints 
 
3. Loss aversion 
 
4. Option theory and investment lags 
 
5. Search theory & matching 
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1. Myopic agents & lags  
(Hog cycle, stock flow models) 
 Idea 
 
Starting point: Unanticipated increase in 
demand 
Strong increase in prices due to (short-
term) supply shortage 
Myopic developers and mortgage 
lenders base decisions on observed prices 
 
 Consequence? 
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Myopic agents & lags (cont.) 
*
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e
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e
1P
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Myopic agents & lags—Continued 
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Myopic agents & lags—Continued 
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Myopic agents & lags—Continued 
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Myopic agents & lags—Continued 
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Predictions 
 In places with elastic long-term supply, 
unexpected positive demand shocks lead to 
 
Significant overbuilding (high vacancy rates)  
if prices are sticky or 
Drop in property prices or 
Both 
 
 In commercial RE: Excess supply greater if 
existing tenants have long term leases 
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Empirical evidence 
 Dallas & Houston (TX) in 80s 
 
 Unexpected boom in late 70s lead to 
severe overbuilding caused by myopic 
developers & mortgage lenders 
 Subsequent oil price shock and recession 
lead to price collapse 
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1980s Bust in Dallas and Houston 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Why Dallas and Houston? 
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Houston
Critique 
 Relies on expectation errors on the part of 
supply actors (developers, bankers) 
 
 Even if supply actors are myopic, are they 
likely to constantly repeat mistakes? 
 
 Merely anecdotic evidence 
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2. Irrational exuberance (euphoria) 
 Idea 
 Investors observe strong past price increases 
 “Plausible story” tells them that price increases will go 
on forever  
 Excessive/unrealistic public expectations of future 
price increases start to form 
 Buyers become euphoric and increase their 
reservation prices 
 Herding behaviour of investors further spurs demand 
which raises prices (vicious cycle) ultimately creating 
‘bubble’ 
 
 Refers to a situation in which excessive public expectations of future 
price increases cause prices to be temporarily elevated (Case and 
Shiller 2003) 
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Predictions 
 Property prices can strongly deviate from 
values that are supported by fundamentals 
 
 “Bubbles” ultimately end in price crash 
  
(Definition of “bubble” according to Case & 
Shiller (2003): Refers to a situation in which 
excessive public expectations of future price 
increases cause prices to be temporarily 
elevated) 
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Empirical evidence 
 Tulip Bubble in 17th Century (controversial) 
 Internet equity-bubble in late 1990s 
 In real estate? 
Asset bubble in Japan (incl. RE) during late 1980s 
Indirect evidence from survey results  
(Case & Shiller 1988, 2003, Case, Shiller & 
Thompson 2012) 
Capozza et al. (2004): Show that serial correlation 
is stronger in booming markets consistent with 
‘euphoria’ and backward-looking expectations 
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Critique 
 Non-falsifiable: Theory is long on predictions but 
short on testable hypotheses 
 Can look at residuals (actual price minus fundamental 
price)  But is this evidence for euphoria or OVs / 
model misspecification? 
 Survey evidence only very indirect 
 Theoretical arguments 
 Are purchases and sales in housing markets really 
mainly driven by investment (rather than consumption) 
motives? And are homebuyers really ‘euphoric’ 
 High transaction costs should reduce speculative 
incentives 
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3. Liquidity constraints  
 Developed by Stein (1995) & Ortalo-Magne & 
Rady (2005) 
 
 Idea 
 
 Income shock strongly affects ability of potential 
first-time buyer to afford down-payment on a 
starter home 
 If income   demand    HP  capital 
gain for existing owners   demand for trade-
up home  … 
 Can have dramatic impact on overall housing 
market 
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Empirical evidence 
 Lamont & Stein (1999) 
 In cities with a large fraction of highly leveraged 
homeowners (first-time buyers), HP react more 
sensitively to city-specific shocks  
 Genesove and Mayer (1997 AER) 
 High LTV homeowners set higher asking prices 
(because need to be able to buy next home) 
 Have longer expected time on market &  
 Ultimately sell at higher price 
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Critique 
 Only applies to residential RE 
 Cannot explain commercial RE cycles, yet they 
are even more pronounced 
 Assumes no role for developers—cannot 
explain overbuilding phenomenon 
 
 Alternative explanations 
 ‘Leveraged cities’ might also be places with 
more inelastic supply of housing (untested) 
 Findings might be due to ‘loss aversion’…. 
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4. Loss aversion 
 Theory developed by Kahneman & Tversky 
(1991) 
 
 Applied to real estate by  
Genesove & Mayer (2001) 
 
 Idea 
 
 Property owners are  
loss averse and are  
not willing to sell with  
loss in downturn 
 
 28 
Intro – stylized facts       Exogenous cycles – theory/evidence       Further puzzles       Endogenous cycles       Conclusions 
Source: Genesove and 
Mayer (2001, QJE) 
Predictions 
 Sellers’ reservation prices are less flexible 
downward than buyers’ offers 
 
 Seller characteristics (loss aversion) affects 
transaction  prices 
 Transaction volume falls and time on market 
increases when prices decline  
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Empirical evidence 
 Genesove & Mayer (2001, QJE) 
 
 Loss aversion matters a lot 
 Liquidity constraints still matter, but much 
less than thought previously  
 Listing price only affected if seller is 
severely downpayment-constrained 
(LTV>0.8) 
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Critique 
 Similar to liquidity constraints 
 
 Also cannot explain overbuilding 
phenomenon: no role for developers 
 Can it explain commercial cycles? Are 
profit maximizing developers loss averse? 
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5. Option theory and investment lag 
 Theory developed by Grenadier (1995) 
 
 Key idea 
 
Consider profit maximising owner of land 
 
What is the optimal timing to exercise the option 
to develop and the option to rent out extra 
units? 
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Prediction 
 Increase in demand volatility  
 
 Increases value of option to wait 
 Makes excess capacity more profitable  
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Empirical evidence 
 Real estate markets with most volatile 
demand (office) display greatest degree of 
vacancy rate stickiness 
 
 Existence of building booms in times of 
declining demand 
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Critique 
 
 
 Does good job explaining sticky vacancy 
rate and overbuilding phenomena but less 
good at explaining other phenomena 
 
 Evidence is largely consistent with theory 
but not absolutely conclusive 
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6. Search theory and matching 
 Builds on work by Mortensen, Diamond & 
Pissarides, first applied to real estate by 
Wheaton (1990), refined by Head et al. (2014) 
 
 Idea 
 
 Buyers expend costly search effort to find better 
house, while sellers hold two units until buyer is 
found 
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Mechanism 
 Income shock spurs immediate increase in house 
search as HHs (buyers) enter 
 
 It takes time for buyers to find suitable houses and 
for construction to respond 
 
 To meet immediate housing demand, vacant 
houses are shifted to rental market  tightness of 
owner-occupied market rises  Sales price  
 
 Eventually: Construction   vacant homes   
 
 As income reverts to long-run level, stock of 
buyers declines  buyer-to-seller ratio falls  
price reverts to steady-state 
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Evidence 
 Diaz & Jerez (2013) & Head et al. (2014) 
 Income shocks cause prices, construction levels 
and vacancy rates to respond cyclically, 
consistent with search & matching mechanism 
 
 Ngai & Tenreyro (2014) 
 Seasonal moving patterns and weather 
fluctuations cause “hot” and “cold” seasons in 
housing market, consistent with search & 
matching 
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Critique 
 Mainly applies to residential RE 
 Cannot really explain commercial RE cycles, yet 
they are even more pronounced 
 Some price cycles are not associated with strong 
cyclicality in vacancy rates or construction 
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Conclusions & policy implications 
1. Housing cycles can often be explained by 
altering economic demand shocks (business 
cycles) in conjunction with inelastic long-run 
supply 
 
2. Policy implication: In places with inelastic 
supply – be cautious with place-based policies 
 ‘help people—not places’ 
 
3. Many cycles – especially commercial ones – 
are ‘endogenously driven’ 
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Conclusions & implications (cont.) 
4. Office and retail cycles often bear almost no relation 
to broader economic cyclicality  
 Cycles triggered by initial economic shock 
 Causes oscillations to eventually revert to long-run trend 
 Cycles often very pronounced 
 
5. Residential and commercial RE differ because 
involved agents and underlying assets differ 
 Investment vs. consumption motives 
 Importance of liquidity constraints & loss aversion 
 Demand volatility & durability of assets differ 
 Time lags differ (planning & construction lags, lease length) 
 
 No single theory can explain all phenomena; 
many factors drive real estate cycles! 
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Thank you! 
 
Q&A 
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Q&A 
I. Key readings 
LECTURE 1 (EXOGENOUS CYCLES) 
 
Hilber, C. and W. Vermeulen, 2016, “The Impact of Supply Constraints on 
House Prices in England,” Economic Journal 126, 358-405. 
 
LECTURE 2 (ENDOGENOUS CYCLES) 
 
Case, K., R. Shiller and A.K. Thompson, 2012, “What Have They Been 
Thinking? Homebuyer Behavior in Hot and Cold Markets,” Brooking 
Papers on Economic Activity Fall 2012, 265-315. 
Capozza, D. R., P. H. Hendershott and C. Mack, 2004, “An Anatomy of Price 
Dynamics in Illiquid Markets: Analysis and Evidence from Local Housing 
Markets,” Real Estate Economics 32(1), 1-32. 
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